Search results for "Coordination Game"
showing 10 items of 16 documents
Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication
2020
Abstract Two alternative modes of reasoning in coordination games are prominently discussed in the literature: level-k thinking and team reasoning. In order to differentiate between the two modes of reasoning, we experimentally investigate payoff-asymmetric coordination games using an intra-group communication design that incentivizes subjects to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. We find that the reasoning process is significantly different between games. In payoff-symmetric games, team reasoning plays an important role for coordination. In payoff-asymmetric games, level-k reasoning results in frequent miscoordination. Our study clearly illustrates how small differences between …
Defense versus Opulence? An Appraisal of the Malthus-Ricardo 1815 Controversy on the Corn Laws
2015
This article proposes a rational reconstruction of the arguments of Malthus and Ricardo in their 1815 essays, Grounds of an Opinion and An Essay on Profits, whereby a policy of free corn trade was repudiated and endorsed, respectively. Malthus envisaged defense and (trade-induced) opulence as two mutually alternative options and, if required to make a choice, he had no hesitation in choosing the former. By contrast, Ricardo excluded any such trade-off, arguing that even in the case of war or poor domestic harvest, foreign agricultural countries would be seriously damaged if they opted for restrictions on their corn exports to Great Britain.
Equilibrium characterization of networks under conflicting preferences
2017
In this work we characterize equilibrium introduced in configurations for networks with conflicting preferences. We use the model Hernandez et al. (2013) to study the effect of three main factors: the strength of individual preferences, the level of integration in the network, and the intensity of conflict in the population. Our aim is to understand how likely is it that social outcomes are either those in which preferences dominate choices or those in which some individuals sacrifice their preferences to achieve consensus with others. Our results show that, the stronger individual preferences, the harder to achieve consensus in choices. However, in cases where the payoff ratio is less extr…
Coordination policies to support decision making in distributed production planning
2003
Abstract Distributed production networks are considered organizational structures able to match agility and efficiency necessary to compete in the global market. Performances of such organization structures heavily depend on the ability of the network actors of coordinating their activities. The research proposes to model and design coordination problems within production network by using the Multiple Agent Technology. In particular, the paper proposes new strategies for coordinating production-planning activities within production networks. Such models have been developed and tested by using a proper simulation environment developed by using open source code and architecture. The results o…
Nash codes for noisy channels
2012
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an equilibrium or "Nash code" results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observati…
Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game
2009
Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equili…
Authority and Coordination
1995
There are many possible starting points for attempts to link authority with the coordination of human interactions: the most famous forerunner here is of course David Hume with his theory of justice. I will, however, start from a more recent classic. Herbert A. Simon’s Administrative Behaviour (1945, 2nd ed. 1957) includes an important theory for the role of authority. It is an obvious sign of the lack of communication between different branches and traditions in social theory that many jurists and political theorists emphasizing the coordinative functions of authority have paid no attention to Simon’s classical book.
The Role of Force
1995
Max Weber defined the state as an organization which successfully maintained the monopoly of legitimate violence over certain territory. This definition, simple as it is, raises several problems. Firstly, it should be noted that it is at best the definition of the modern State. There have been organizations which are, perhaps anachronistically, called states by historians or anthropologists, but which did not satisfy the definition.
WITHIN-TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME
2006
. We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.
Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application
2008
We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto op…